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Abstract
This thoughtful contribution to American and German legal literature provides valuable insights for a reader interested in comparing the decisionmaking methodology under the West German and American systems of antitrust law. The work also provides a broader discussion of key
distinctions between the jurisprudential and systematic foundations of West Germany’s continental
legal system and those of the Anglo-American common law system.
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Reviewed by W. David Braun*
This thoughtful contribution to American and German
legal literature provides valuable insights for a reader interested in comparing the decisionmaking methodology under
the West German and American systems of antitrust law. The
work also provides a broader discussion of key distinctions between the jurisprudential and systematic foundations of West
Germany's continental legal system and those of the AngloAmerican common law system. The book is a product of a dissertation that Dr. Maxeiner prepared while he was at the MaxPlanck-Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law in Munich, West Germany.
The work is not intended to serve as a general introduction to German antitrust law, the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen. t Instead, the author's objective is to analyze
the methodology of West German antitrust law and determine
whether certain of its elements may lend themselves to achieving a more just and predictable application of American antitrust law. The author's expectations about the extent of transferability of concepts from one legal system to another are justifiably cautious. "While the foreign solution may be studied
to consider its transplantation home [he argues], this use of
* Partner, Gardner, Carton & Douglas, Chicago, Illinois. Mr. Braun was a
Research Fellow at the Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign and International Patent,
Copyright and Competition Law, Munich, West Germany, 1978 - 1979, and served in
the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Chicago, 1975 - 1978;
Washington, D.C., 1979 - 1984.
1. For English translations of German antitrust law and other commentaries, see
generally F. BEIER, G. SCHRICKER & W. FIKENTSCHER, GERMAN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY,
COPYRIGHT AND ANTITRUST LAWS (1983); R. MUELLER, M. HEIDENHAIN & H. SCHNEIDER, GERMAN ANTITRUST LAW (3d ed. 1984); OECD, II GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON
RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES-GERMANY (Supp. 1984); M. RIESENKAMPF &J. GRES,
LAW AGAINST RESTRAINTS
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comparative law does not require that transplantation be the
object of study. Critical examination of different legal solutions heightens awareness of the problems and of the variety of
solutions, and thus widens the range of potential solutions
even where transplantation is not anticipated." (p. 4). This reviewer is persuaded that while West German antitrust law does
not reflect current American antitrust enforcement policy,
American antitrust law could benefit from several procedural
and organizational advantages of German law.
Dr. Maxeiner points out that West German antitrust law is
particularly apt for comparative analysis with its American
counterpart. In 1957 West Germany adopted its current antitrust law, which replaced the decartelization decrees that the
Allies had imposed after World War II. The West German law
largely represents the enactment of American antitrust principles within the framework of the German continental legal system. The law consists of over 100 articles, of which roughly
the first quarter are substantive rules that provide detailed
norms and exceptions in a format similar to our Uniform Commercial Code. The West German law provides specific guidance to a much greater degree than the few rather vague
clauses that typify American antitrust law. Therefore, unlike
American antitrust law, it has not been subject to the same
wide range of interpretations.
Two additional factors make West German antitrust law
especially appropriate for comparison with American antitrust
law. First, the German law has an unequivocal free market orientation, partly based on the influence of the Freiburg School.
Dr. Maxeiner explains that followers of the Freiburg School
prefer the competitive economic system
not only because they consider it more efficient, but, perhaps still more important, because they believe it more
democratic. They criticize purely economic perspectives
that separate economic well-being from the issue of freedom. They reject a centrally administered economy not
only because they perceive it to be economically inefficient,
but also because they consider the concentration of power
in the hands of the state it brings to be inconsistent with
democratic principles. (p. 7).
This orientation was largely consistent with the American antitrust orientation throughout the 1960's and early 1970's. Sec-
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ond, German antitrust law is the most stringent and aggressively-enforced body of antitrust law in any country outside the
United States. The law is enforced by approximately 100
highly qualified and dedicated professionals in the Federal
Cartel Office, located in Berlin. The Federal Cartel Office's
principal enforcement tasks are to impose stiff penalties
against bid-rigging and market allocation schemes among
competitors, and to deter anticompetitive mergers and joint
ventures. Quasi-criminal administrative fines reaching into the
millions of German marks are not uncommon as sanctions for
bid-rigging and price-fixing. One might argue that in the last
several years the Federal Cartel Office has taken a tougher
stance on anticompetitive mergers than have American antitrust authorities.
It is Dr. Maxeiner's thesis that the problems afflicting antitrust law in the United States are largely problems of legal
method. Antitrust laws in the United States and West Germany, he argues, are "judged differently not so much because
they diverge widely in substance, but because they differ
greatly in method." (p. 116). He lists several fundamental differences in methodological approach between American and
West German antitrust laws. (p. 5). On the West German side,
he emphasizes the normative orientation of antitrust law, the
active role played by specialized decision makers, and the fact
that antitrust law is often applied as a matter of administrative
law. He contrasts these methodological approaches with the
American reliance on judge-made law, which does not insist on
the attainment of a norm, the passive role played by nonspecialized decision makers in the resolution of complex technical issues, and the wholly judicial nature of American antitrust law.
Since the rise of the Chicago School in the United States,
the paths of antitrust policy in Germany and in the United
States have also diverged substantively. A dramatic shift in
United States antitrust policy has occurred without legislative
action to change a single fundamental clause of any American
antitrust statute. This shift was possible because the vagueness
of American antitrust rules leaves considerable latitude to the
courts and to the political system to carry out such a change.
The Chicago School has recently concentrated antitrust inquiry on the alleged restraint's impact on so-called "consumer
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welfare," which essentially calls for an analysis of whether the
restraint in question enhances or restricts "economic efficiency." Thus, antitrust rules should not interfere with a
merger between direct competitors if the combined firms
would operate more efficiently by merging, since this will tend
to expand output, which lowers prices and thereby enhances
consumer welfare. Likewise, sales below cost by a large firm
with market power are not necessarily suspect. Smaller rivals
may be disadvantaged, but the consumer enjoys the immediate
benefit of lower prices. If the larger firm later raises prices,
new entrants will enter the market and prevent the larger firm
from exploiting its position so long as regulatory impediments
or other barriers to entry do not discourage such entry. The
Chicago School places a high level of confidence in the inherent self-correcting mechanisms of a free market to counteract
the creation or exercise of market power.2
The inquiry that must be carried out under German lawboth in terms of the policy orientation of the statute and the
enforcement attitude of the Cartel Office-largely follows the
antitrust policy familiar to American antitrust enforcers in the
1960's and 1970's. That policy calls for preserving deconcentrated market structures over the long term in the field of
merger control even if the merger is likely to bring immediate
benefits to the consumer in the form of lower prices. German
antitrust law also attempts to inhibit single-firm conduct, such
as selling below cost, which may benefit the consumer in the
short run but which may also be capable of harming weaker
competitors to the extent that they exit from the market,
thereby causing deterioration of market structure. German antitrust policy places less reliance on self-correcting free market
mechanisms, such as rapid entry into a market, to counteract
the creation or exercise of market power.
Current American antitrust enforcement officials would
probably question the relative rigidity and lack of confidence in
the dynamism of a free market economy that typifies German
antitrust policy. The new Chicago School approach to Ameri2. See, e.g., Department ofJustice Merger Guidelines, June 14, 1984, reprinted in 2
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4490, at 6879; Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx.
L. REV. 1 (1984); Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies,48 U. CI. L.
REV. 263 (1981); Department ofJustice, Economic Policy Office Tenth Anniversary Seminar

on Economics and Antitrust, EPO Discussion Paper Nos. 83-13 and 83-14 (1983).
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can antitrust policy has not escaped the attention of German
antitrust commentators and enforcement officials. A leading
German antitrust commentator has termed the Chicago School
orientation the "strongest intellectual challenge" that German
antitrust has had yet to face, and one of the German Cartel
Office's best intellects has referred to the need to "comprehend" the fundamental reasons for the new American orientation.
The rise of the Chicago School of antitrust law can be
traced, in part, to factors largely unknown to German antitrust
law. These include a growing recognition that admittedly
vague American antitrust rules were being pushed in aggressive private actions and government suits to encompass an increasingly wide circle of conduct whose outer limits were ever
more uncertain. Of no less significance is the enormous cost
and complexity of American antitrust litigation as well as the
steady growth of a body of economic literature which disputes
longstanding tenants of American antitrust, particularly with
respect to such issues as vertical restraints, conglomerate and
vertical mergers, and the criteria for market definition.
There can be little doubt that the inherent flexibility of
American antitrust rules has permitted the dynamic development of United States antitrust law to an extent that is bewildering to continental lawyers. This flexibility has a distinct
positive side as well. The American court's persistent expansion of the scope of antitrust law into new sectors of the economy has been largely advantageous to consumers and to the
economy as a whole. Examples are the expanded application
of antitrust rules even to regulated industries-such as banking, trucking, railroads and telecommunications-under the
doctrine that "[r]epeals of the antitrust laws by implication
from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and have
only been found in cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions";4 application of the rule
against price-fixing to fees charged by professionals such as accountants, 5 engineers, 6 lawyers, 7 and physicians,' and the ap3. K. Markert, Die Praxis der Fusionskontrolle und der Missbrauchsaufsicht
1984/85, at 66 (FIW-Schriftenreihe No. 117 1986).
4. See, e.g. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 320, 350-51 (1963).
5. United States v. Texas State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 464 F. Supp 400 (W.D.
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plication of antitrust norms to international cartels that harm
American consumers. 9 There has been very little parallel development in German antitrust law.
The American courts have also been capable of retrenching when appropriate. In the Sylvania' ° case the
Supreme Court overruled its earlier Schwinn" doctrine, the
end result being to take non-price vertical restraints out of the
category of a per se violation and subject them instead to the
Rule of Reason. Likewise, the Supreme Court declared in the
Broadcast Music' 2 decision that the Rule of Reason rather than
the per se rule should be applied to test the legality of "blanket"music performance licenses offered by copyright holders
who had marketed such licenses through a joint venture even
though the "blanket" license involved price-fixing in the literal
sense. In the field of mergers, the Supreme Court's GeneralDynamics' 3 decision calls for a more thoughtful economic analysis
of the likely future competitive impact of merging firms rather
than allowing the party challenging the merger to rely largely
on past and present market shares when they are no longer a
fair indication of ability to compete in the future.
It is precisely the lack of flexibility to adapt to and incorporate the most recent economic learning into antitrust analysis that is perhaps the key weakness in German antitrust law.
The rigid detail of the 1980 amendment to the German merger
control provisions provides an extreme example. The new
§ 23a of the German law provides in substance that a firm with
total sales of about US$1 billion will be presumed to have engaged in an anticompetitive acquisition if it acquires a firm operating in a market in which "small and medium-sized enterTex. 1978), aff'd and modified per curiam, 592 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
925 (1979).
6. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1982).
7. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
8. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
9. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); Timken Roller Bearing
v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp.
504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), modified, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
10. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
11. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
12. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979).
13. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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prises have a combined market share of at least two-thirds and
the enterprises participating in the merger have a combined
market share of at least five percent." 4 Thus, financial
strength associated with mere size alone is presumed to have an
anticompetitive effect on the market of the acquired firm even
when there is no competitive relationship between the merging
firms. This form of statutory presumption, which is rebuttable,
provides a higher level of legal certainty than Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, the American antimerger statute. Yet the economic assumption underlying the German statute would be
found shocking to Chicago School economists and probably to
many non-Chicagoans. Nor is this discussion theoretical. The
German Supreme Court in Civil Matters recently affirmed a
decision of the Cartel Office under a different antimerger provision that has understandably been the subject of debate in
Germany. The decision prohibited an acquisition by
Rheinmetall, a German arms manufacturer, of WMF, a dominant producer of tableware and kitchen goods. The court reasoned that availability of the acquiror's financial resources
would entrench the dominant market position of WMF, which
was several times larger than its next largest rival. 5 Whether
such a decision can be justified as preserving "competition" as
opposed to other values is open to question.
The Germans have made an economic policy decision that
is clearly not based principally upon Chicago School analysis of
economic efficiency and in many instances bears at best a loose
relationship to preservation of "competition" as opposed to
protection of certain classes of competitors. Germany has chosen to preserve traditional forms of market structure while recognizing that this choice is not always compatible with an optimally "efficient" market structure. German merger control enforcement now probably represents the strongest national
policy in the world favoring preservation of a wide range of
14. Law Against Restraints of Competition, § 23a(l)(1)(a), BGBI. 1 1761 (1980)
(amending BGBI. 1 1081 (1957)).
15. Edelstahlbestecke, WuW/E BGH 2150 (1985) ("Rheinmetall/WMF"). A
decision based on similar grounds was issued in 1978 when GKN, a British manufacturer of automobile drive-train products, planned to acquire Sachs AG, Germany's
dominant supplier of automobile clutches. Kfz-Kupplungen, WuW/E BGH 1501
(1978). For a discussion of this case and of German merger control generally, see
Belke & Braun, German Merger Control: A European Approach to Anticompetitive Takeovers,
1 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 371 (1979).
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consumer choice by maintaining existing market structure
even if vetoing the merger prevents the realization of efficiencies. That is a choice which any free market economy subject
to democratic control must face. What is perhaps most important is that the democratic process makes a conscious decision
that it wishes to preserve existing market structures at the potential expense of greater efficiency and increased output. It is
not unreasonable to contend that Germany has made this decision (perhaps under the influence of outdated economic assumptions in the United States) through the detailed body of
antitrust law adopted by its lawmakers. A growing debate in
Germany over the value of Chicago School theory is leading to
thoughtful re-evaluation of the direction of German antitrust
policy.
Dr. Maxeiner's book has made a telling contribution to
scholarship in this area by its emphasis on differences in methods employed in American and West German antitrust laws.
One of the principal advantages of the German legal system
over the American system is the procedure for taking proof.
This is where the Germans properly place emphasis on the fair
and efficient administration of justice, thus facilitating prompt
decisions in a case without crippling expense to the litigants.
Jury trials are unknown to German antitrust law, and the judge
truly controls the taking of proof. There is no discovery procedure. The author comments: "In judicial proce[edings] the
judge calls witnesses for the court and the parties both. The
parties do not present their own witnesses and their preparation of witnesses is held to be unethical. There is no presentation of separate cases for each side. The judge is responsible
for questioning witnesses. The parties ask supplemental questions to fill out the witness's testimony." (pp. 85-86). This key
procedural distinction assures that the judicial inquiry is focused on essential facts. When combined with the absence of
our expensive and cumbersome pre-trial discovery procedure
and the continental rule that the losing party pays the winner's
attorney fees, it is no wonder that the length, complexity, and
cost of antitrust proceedings in Germany are kept within more
reasonable bounds than in the United States. If American
judges would assert greater control over civil antitrust proceedings generally (as well as over other forms of civil litigation), and particularly if the scope of pre-trial discovery were
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limited to areas of inquiry determined in advance by the judge
instead of by the lawyers, the time and expense of pre-trial
proceedings might be significantly reduced. "Fishing expeditions" and unmeritorious antitrust suits would be curtailed if
the courts generally awarded attorney's fees to defendants who
prevail in the lawsuit.
American antitrust law might also benefit by careful study
of the German use of specialized courts. Special cartel panels
(senates) have been created at each court of appeals, which review questions of both law and fact on appeal. The existence
of cartel panels helps to assure that judges who hear antitrust
appeals have a specialized background and promotes greater
uniformity of decisionmaking. For instance, appeals from decisions of the Federal Cartel Office are heard by a three-judge
Cartel Senate of the Berlin Chamber Court (Kammergericht),
whose Chairperson, Judge Rosemarie Werner, has a reputation for thorough factual inquiry, incisive analysis and expeditious decisionmaking. Appeals to the German Federal
Supreme Court in Civil-Matters are also heard by a Cartel Senate.' 6 From a practical standpoint, the establishment in the
United States of specialized trial court judicial panels without
juries to hear complex civil antitrust suits, such as monopolization, merger and rule of reason cases, could serve to bring
such monstrously long and costly cases under better judicial
control and lead to more predictable results. Although the
most urgent need for reform in the United States is at the trial
court level, the establishment of specialized antitrust panels at
the appellate level might also make a substantial contribution
to consistency in decisionmaking.
There are few, if any, provisions of German law that could
simply be transplanted to the United States. The procedural
and organizational settings in Germany and the United States
are simply too different. Yet an increased awareness of the different legal methods used in Germany may serve to provoke
constructive thought about how the underlying German concepts might be employed to improve American legal methods.
16. For a general discussion of the organization of the West German appellate
courts, see Meador, Appellate Subject Matter Organization: The German Design from an
American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (1981). See also Langbein,
The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985).
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Dr. Maxeiner's book makes a valuable contribution by stimulating the American antitrust community to a new thought:
while America has given fundamental concepts of antitrust to
West Germany, West Germany may be able to provide
America the methodological tools to implement antitrust concepts more fairly and efficiently.

WATER LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. By LUDWIK
A. TECLAFF. Buffalo, N.Y.: William S. Hein & Co., 1985. xi +
617 pp. $67.50. ISBN 0-89941-460-5
Reviewed by Albert E. Utton*
Water Law in HistoricalPerspective is a tour de force. Professor Teclaff has given us the advantage of his lifelong experience and learning in water law. Every page is enriched by his
mature insight and scholarship.
This book is a virtual encyclopedia within the covers of
one volume. If one wants to refer to groundwater law in Israel,
or riparian surface water law in Spain, or water permits in the
Soviet Union, one can easily find a discussion of each of these
items, as well as other water laws of jurisdictions from Argentina to Yugoslavia. And at the same time each discussion is
placed within the perspective of history. Because of this historical approach, the reader can understand and distinguish between various water doctrines-prior appropriation, for example, which aided in water development, and riparianism, which
placed conservative restraints on such development in Europe
and elsewhere.
The book is divided into two parts. The first consists of a
far ranging discussion of national legal systems, while the second is devoted to the development of international law both as
to surface waters and groundwaters. The discussion of the
river Oder is particularly valuable in that comparatively little is
known about either its status in international law or its history.
The international river basin section is a superb discussion
of treaty practice regarding major river basins. Anyone who
wants to have an understanding of international treaty practice
can easily thumb through the pages of this chapter and come
away with an informed understanding. The chapters on transboundary groundwater pollution and transboundary toxic pollution of drainage basins brings up to date the discussion of
these issues. The various approaches and theories of different
nations are compared and contrasted.
In his final chapter, Professor Teclaff warns us of the "flu* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico; Editor, Natural Resources
Journal; Director, International Transboundary Resource Center.
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vial lesson." He points out that from the middle of the nineteenth century onward, under the impact of increased population and of rapid industrialization, the demand for water began
to grow at such a pace that it is expected to outgrow the existing supply in many regions before the century is over. From
being water surplus regions, Europe and the eastern United
States are turning into water deficient areas. The situation becomes not dissimiliar to that which faced the engineers and administrators of the fluvial civilizations. And the answer, too,
has been much the same-more and bigger dams, more and
bigger reservoirs, more transfers of water over greater distances, and more centralization of administrative control over
water disposition. He warns that if trends in water development and management reflect a general overtaxing of the limited environmental base of ever-expanding economies, then
the inadequate quality of individual life of the fluvial civilization may be in store for us.
The main factors which might tend to propel us in the direction taken by the fluvial civilizations already exist, namely:
1) shrinking water resources; 2) an expanding economy highly
dependent on water; 3) a developmental outlook; 4) the means
to build large projects. The ancient water managers in a similar situation strove relentlessly to match the available water to
the expanding needs of the economy, regardless of cost to the
social and sometimes to the physical environment. As a consequence, they left us the most significant lesson of history-that
without a technological breakthrough which would either provide new sources of water or permit reduced consumption in
many of the tasks which water now performs, sufficient water
for the needs of a growing economy can be provided only at
ever-increasing cost to the physical environment or the social
environment or both. There is a point in water resource development when water can no longer be matched to the economy,
but the economy must be matched to the water available. This
may be a bitter pill to swallow for a development-minded modern society, but history teaches us that when such time arrives
water development must be controlled with the utmost thoroughness.
In the light of past experience, one thing above all should
be asked of modern scientific water management-that major
projects be undertaken only when all their potential effects on
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the totality of the environment have been assessed by all available means. Professor Teclaff goes on to suggest that "present-day technology, wedded to the developmental outlook bequeathed by a water-rich European past, may and can at least
do, what the low energy output of the fluvial civilizations could
not do, namely irreversible damage to the environment, not
just on a local but on a global scale." His final word is "the
fluvial civilizations send a warning across the ages that there is
a limit beyond which water development cannot be pushed
[A] message can be
without impairing the quality of life ....
read that attitudes required in periods and areas of water
plenty dare not be carried over into periods and areas of scarcity. Expansion at the expense of the environment and of the
individual can be avoided if the growth of technology and the
economy is geared to a pace concommitant with maintenance
of the environment as a whole fit for what is considered to be
the 'good life.'"
This striking book is one that anyone interested in water
resources will want to have as an all purpose reference with a
global perspective and a historical insight.

